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ABSTRACT
Biometrics has become a strong candidate to replace
traditional authentication systems however biometric data in 
itself is vulnerable and requires protection. This paper 
presents a new method to protect face biometric data using 
one-way transformation in which original face images 
cannot be retrieved. The secure and reissueable templates 
are generated by utilizing the Radon transformed signatures 
of the face biometric and a multi-space random projection. 
Using an image-based statistical algorithm, authentication is 
conducted on the transformed templates without the need to 
reverse them back. Genuine and impostor distributions 
separation was also improved by 13.82% leading to a
41.35% reduction in the equal error rate. 
Index Terms — cancellable biometric, face recognition, 
Radon transform, random projection. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Although biometrics is a promising alternative to traditional 
authentication systems, there still are some improvements 
required such as better accuracy rates and the analysis of 
dynamic changes.  One of the most challenging issues in is 
security. Biometrics is similar to any other data in terms of 
storage but very different in terms of usage. For example 
data cannot be securely stored using encryption and then 
used for authentication without being decrypted, which 
makes the biometric data vulnerable during the processing 
stage. Therefore, authentication must be conducted on the 
secure version of the data, which in turn will have an impact 
on the accuracy. In addition, due to the permanence of 
biometrics, compromised biometrics cannot be further used 
in an authentic manner by the genuine owners.  Since the 
number of unique characteristics of the human body is 
limited, the number of biometric identities that someone 
could replace is indeed limited. For instance there is only 
one face biometric and it cannot be canceled nor replaced 
when compromised. 
The first attempt to protect biometrics by cryptographic 
verification was for an iris based authentication scheme [1]. 
Error correction code was utilized to overcome the 
dynamical changes of biometrics. A voice biometric 
hardening key algorithm has been developed by extracting a 
distinguishable set of features from voice segments to 
generate a sharing table [2]. The fuzzy vault scheme [3] has 
also been proposed to protect biometrics cryptographically 
by a committed value that is infeasible for an attacker to 
learn. Later, the scheme was implemented on fingerprint 
biometrics [4]. The technique was evaluated at 20-30% false 
rejection rate without the alignment of fingerprint features in 
the fuzzy vault domain, which was later dealt with by Chung 
et al [5]. Another fingerprint based cryptographic key 
scheme has been developed using the uncertainty of the 
multiple-redundant lookup table of a random array mixing, 
[6]. A facial cryptographic user-dependant key generator 
was also introduced by binarizing the optimum 
distinguishable facial features extracted by linear
dimensionality reduction techniques [7]. 
The first cancellable biometric technique was 
introduced using an intentional repeatable distortion of a 
biometrics signal based on chosen transforms [8, 9]. 
Another technique extracts the facial features by a linear 
space projection and then maps them onto a multiple
random subspaces to obtain a quantized binary code (RMQ) 
[10]. Savvides et al [11] generate cancellable biometric by 
encrypting a training set of images to construct a minimum 
average correlation energy filter for face authentication. 
Zeng et al [12] presented a secured biometric key using 
lattice mapping. The biometric feature vector is mapped in 
the lattice space using a certain codeword. Recently another 
cancellable biometric technique [13] has been developed  to 
protect face biometric though the usage of co-occurrence 
matrices and a high-order polynomial mapping. 
In this paper we present a new secure biometric system 
for image-based authentication that generates an endless 
number of non-reversible cancellable templates from the 
same face image by using the Radon transform and multi-
space random projection. The overall method is presented in 
Section 2, Section 3 outlines the eigenface algorithm while 
Section 4 focuses on the parameters for security analysis. 
The results are provided in Section 5 and the conclusion in 
Section 6. 
2. THE RANDOMIZED RADON SIGNATURE (RRS) 
The RRS is a pre-processing stage. As shown in figure 1 
each face image is first transformed into its RRS format 
before being stored in the database or used for 
authentication through a linear feature extraction method. 
The database will contain the RRS templates and their 
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corresponding random subspaces used to generate them. The 
RRS transform is non-reversible which means that the 
original face images are not obtainable even when the 
templates, the transformation function and the random 
subspaces are available.  In case a particular RRS template 
is compromised, different random subspaces will be used to 
generate different RRS template from the same original face 
image. This overcomes the limitation on the number of 
unique biometric characteristics of each individual i.e. for 
one face we can generate an endless number of RRS 
templates. 
The generation of the RRS templates is established over 
three stages. First the face image is transformed into the 
Radon space (parametric domain) using the two-
dimensional equation (1), [14], where ρ and θ are the polar 
coordinates of the domain and f is the image.  
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The Radon signatures of the transformed image are then 
formulated in the parametric domain by the integration of all 
possible orientations within the space at a fixed distance ρ
from the origin, equation (2), where x and y are the spatial 
image coordinates. For each face image there are a set of 
signatures that uniquely represent the face. Using the slice 
theorem, these are proven to be equivalent to the rotational 
integration of the two-dimensional Fourier transform of the 
image (4). )(θiw  is a weighting function. 
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Considering that )(θiw  is selected from a uniformly 
distributed random space, S(ρ) can be presented as a vector 
sl, of all orientations at index l that corresponds to ρ. R is the 
random space in which { }Miwi ,...2,1|)( =θ  are contained, cl
is a vector of all orientations in the parametric domain, and 
1κ  is an offsetting constant. 
Rcs Tll 1κ=    (5) 
Qbf Tll 2κ=    (6) 
Similarly fl is constructed from the spatial domain of 
the face image bl, where l is the index of the image column 
vector, Q is a uniformly distributed random space that is 
independent of R, and 2κ  is a constant offset. The random 
projection in equations (5) and (6) is a linear transformation 
that is based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma [15]. 
( ) ( ) 222 1)()(1 yxyxyx −+≤−<−− εε ff  (7) 
It states that any n points in the p-dimensional 
Euclidean space E can be mapped to an O((ln n)/ε2)-
dimensional space, E’ and f: E→E’, such that the distance 
between any two points, x and y, is preserved within an 
arbitrary factor of ε. This is due to the assumption that 
random subspaces are approximately orthogonal. 
lll fst += QbRc
T
l
T
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The final stage of the RRS template { }Nll ,...,2,1| =t
formulation is the mixing operation of the M-dimensional 
vectors sl and fl. Since R is independent and different from 
Q, and neither bl nor cl are known, the RRS template { }Nll ,...,2,1| =t  cannot be demixed nor reversed. 
Obviously the template does not resemble the facial shape 
nor contains any visual information. 
In theory, these RRS templates can replace the original 
face images in any image-based authentication system that 
uses statistical linear feature extraction methods such as 
PCA, FDA etc. For the purpose of this paper, the RRS 
templates are evaluated using the eigenface algorithm [16]. 
3. LINEAR FEATURE EXTRACTION
The eigenface algorithm is an image-based statistical 
approach for face features linear extraction [16]. Let 
Γ1,Γ2,…ΓL be the face images and L is the number of 
training images. Each face differs from the average face Ψ
by the vector Φi=Γi-Ψ, where i corresponds to the ith face 
image Γi. 
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A set of d’ orthogonal vectors, uk, are selected to 
describe the best distribution of the data. The kth vector is 
chosen such that λk is a maximum subject to δlk. ( )∑
=
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L
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The vector uk and the scalar λk are the eigenvector and 
the eigenvalue of covariance matrix, C. When a new face 
image is acquired for authentication, Γnew, it will be 
projected as shown in (13) into the eigenface space to 
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Figure 1: The conceptual diagram of the RRS framework.
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extract the weights, ΩT=[ω1,ω2,ω3,…,ωd’], which are then 
used to find the minimum Euclidean distance, εc, with the 
corresponding face class c. 
∑
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ΦΦC   (12) 
( )ΨΓu −= newTkkω   (13) 
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4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As explained above the system equation (8) is not reversible 
due to the absence of original face images. Therefore, two 
different types of attacks will be considered in this section. 
The first is an exhaustive search attack (ESA) with the 
assumption that no information is available on the RRS 
templates except of the random subspaces, the transform 
function and the templates themselves. 
Let n be the number of binary bits contained in each 
template.  The probability of ESA to succeed is defined by 
the length n, which is in the order of 4101× . Therefore the 
ESA probability of the RRS template given by nESAP
−
=
12  
is negligible, which indicates the immunity of the templates 
against such attacks. 
An elegant attack can be conducted if some statistical 
information on the RRS templates is available. To analysis 
this type of risk the guessing entropy and its Shannon 
entropy lower-bound are used [17]. Let Tc be a set of RRS 
templates of the same class c=1,2,..K. The number of 
registered templates per class in the database m is 
determined by the system and fixed for all classes. However, 
because the ideal condition ∞→WB εε  when 0→Wε and 
εB>εW does not exist for any functioning classifier, the
lower-bound of the guessing entropy G(T) tends to Ge(T) 
(16), where εB and εW are the average distances between 
classes and within classes respectively. H(T) is the Shannon 
entropy. 
12)( )(4
1 +≥ TT HG   (15) 
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m
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This leaves us with a lower-bound that is proportional 
to the number of registered classes and templates per class 
in the RRS database. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The Olivetti Research Ltd (ORL) face database [18] has 
been used for this evaluation. It has 40 classes with 10 
images each. Images were captured under no constraints on 
expressions but with limited side movement tolerated tilt, 
and stored in 112× 92 pixels. 
For comparison two separate eigenface projections are 
conducted with five enrolled training images or templates 
per class. Therefore the lower-bound of the guessing entropy 
(16) of the RRS templates is Ge(T) ≥ 51 since m=5 and 
K=40. And since n=8× 112× 92 bits, the ESA success 
probability is almost zero PESA≈0. The accuracy 
performance is evaluated using the false acceptance (FAR), 
false rejection (FRR) and equal error (EER) rates as 
indicators for a verification based procedure. 
Investigating the genuine and impostor distributions of 
the original images and the RRS templates has shown in 
figure 2 a clearer separation with a reduced overlap that 
leads to a reduction of 41.35% in the EER. 
D μg μi d’ EER[%]
Original 2.46 8.49 17.95 19 12.0038 
RRS 2.80 3.51 9.24 44 7.0397 
Table 1: The best operation point of the original images and 
the RRS templates. d’ is number of eigenvector used. 
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Figure 2. The genuine and impostor distributions. The left hand-side plot shows the overlap between both distributions of the original 
face images that has been reduced for the RRS templates as shown in the right hand-side plot. 
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Another way of evaluating the distribution separation is 
the measure D [19], the higher the value of D the better the 
performance. Using the mean μg and the standard deviation 
σg of the genuine distribution and their equivalents μi and σi
of the impostor distribution, the measure shows an 
improvement of 13.82% for the RRS templates as shown in 
Table 1. 
( )2221 igigD σσμμ +−=   (17) 
The relationship between the FAR and the FRR is 
illustrated by the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve shown in figure 3. The error rates of the RRS
templates are less dependent on each other from that of the 
original images. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this work a new cancellable biometric technique was 
introduced. The RSS templates are non-reversible and can 
replace normal face images in current image-based 
statistical face authentication systems. By changing the 
multi-random spaces new issues of the same face biometric 
can be produced. Using the eigenface algorithm the 
evaluation has shown an improved separation of genuine 
and impostor distributions by 13.82%. This in turn has 
reduced the EER to 7.04% leading to a 58.65% accuracy 
enhancement for the RRS templates over the original face 
images. 
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Figure 3: The ROC curves of the original images and the RRS 
templates.
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